Information Technology

A newly discovered form of malware is targeting Apple MacOS users in a campaign which researchers say is tied to a nation-state backed hacking operation.
The campaign has been detailed by cybersecurity analysts at Trend Micro who’ve linked it to OceanLotus – also known as APT32 – a hacking group which is thought to have links to the Vietnamese government.
OceanLotus is known to target foreign organisations working in Vietnam including media, research and construction and while the motivation for this isn’t fully understood, the aim is thought to be to using espionage to aid Vietnamese-owned companies.
The MacOS backdoor provides the attackers with a window into the compromised machine, enabling them to snoop on and steal confidential information and sensitive business documents.
The security company’s researchers have linked it to OceanLotus because of the similarities in code and behaviour of the malware, compared with samples used in previous campaigns by the group.
The attacks begin with phishing emails which attempt to encourage victims to run a Zip file disguised as a Word document. It evades detection by anti-virus scanners by using special characters deep inside a series of Zip folders.
SEE: A winning strategy for cybersecurity (ZDNet special report) | Download the report as a PDF (TechRepublic) 

The attack could potentially give itself away if users are paying attention because when the malicious file is run, a Microsoft Word document doesn’t appear. 
However, at this stage an initial payload is already working on the machine and it changes access permissions in order to load a second-stage payload which then prompts the installation of a third-stage payload – which downloads the backdoor onto the system. By installing the malware across different stages like this OceanLotus aims to evade detection.
Like older versions of the malware, this attack aims to collect system information and creates a backdoor allowing the hackers to snoop on and download files, as well as upload additional malicious software to the system if required. It’s thought that the malware is still actively being developed.
“Threat groups such as OceanLotus are actively updating malware variants in attempts to evade detection and improve persistence,” wrote researchers.
To help avoid falling victim to this and other malware campaigns, Trend Micro urges users to be cautious about clicking links or downloading attachments from emails coming from suspicious or unknown sources.
It’s also recommended that organisations apply security patches and other updates to software and operating systems so malware isn’t able to take advantage of known vulnerabilities which can be protected against.
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Image: Kashaf et al.
In 2016, Dyn, a provider of managed DNS servers, was the victim of a massive DDoS attack that crippled the company’s operations and took down domain-name-resolving operations for more than 175,000 websites.
While some sites managed to stay up by activating a redundancy and switching DNS resolving to secondary servers, many websites were not prepared and remained down for almost a day as Dyn dealt with the attack.
Also: Best web hosting services 2020: Wix, WordPress, and more 
Four years later, a team of academics from Carnegie Mellon University have conducted a large-scale study of the top 100,000 websites on the internet to see how website operators reacted to this attack and how many are still operating with one single DNS provider and no other backup.
Their findings, published at the Internet Measurement Conference last month, show that, currently, in 2020, 89.2% of all websites use a third-party DNS provider rather than managing their own DNS server.
But even worse is the fact that 84.8% of all analyzed websites relied on one single DNS provider, without having a backup redundancy to which they could switch in case of a failure or attack.

Image: Kashaf et al.
The CMU team says the number of sites with a critical DNS dependency (no redundancy) has gone up by 4.7% since 2016, showing that the lessons site operators were supposed to learn following the Dyn DDoS attack lessons have been largely, and almost immediately, forgotten.

Researchers point out that while two websites (2%) in the Top 100 added backup DNS servers since 2016, smaller websites continued to use one single DNS service provider without a backup, and in most cases, many site operators chose to go with a known provider, contributing to a long-observed tendency of consolidation among internet service providers.
Currently, CMU researchers say that the Top-3 DNS providers —Cloudflare (24%), AWS (12%), and GoDaddy (4%)— are the single DNS providers of around 38% of the Top 100,000 sites in the Alexa ranking.
In addition, four DNS providers are the lone critical providers for more than half of the Alexa Top 100 website list.
Any intentional attack or accidental hardware or software failure at one of these three providers can bring down a large chunk of the internet with them, something that appears to happen once in a while [1, 2], still.
Furthermore, researchers point out that even if there are more than 10,000 DNS providers serving the Alexa Top 100k sites, most have indirect dependencies back to a handful of providers, such as Cloudflare, AWS, GoDaddy, Namecheap, Oracle (formerly Dyn), and others.
The researchers also not that of the website operators who chose to add a redundancy, most were customers of Dyn, NS1, UltraDNS, and DNSMadeEasy.
“This may be because these providers encourage the use of secondary DNS provider by giving specific guidelines to seamlessly incorporate a secondary DNS provider,” the research team noted.
“High redundancy for Dyn and NS1 customers could alsobe a result of large-scale attacks on Dyn and NS1.”
But the study took similar looks at the state third-party services and critical dependencies (no redundancies) for websites using CDNs (content delivery networks) and CAs (certificate authorities).
The results were similar to the team’s research on DNS, with many websites operating with either their CDN or CA OCSP stapling provider as a point of failure in their operations, without any backup redundancy.

Image: Kashaf et al.
Additional details about the team’s research are available in an academic paper titled “Analyzing Third Party Service Dependencies in Modern WebServices: Have We Learned from the Mirai-Dyn Incident?,” also available as a PDF document.
A video of the research team presenting its findings is available below.
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IBM Cloud said it will offer cryptography technology that will be futureproofed for quantum computing deployments.
Big Blue, which is among the key players in the quantum computing race, launched Quantum Safe Cryptography for Key Management and Application Transactions.
Quantum computing promises to solve new problems, leap past supercomputers and possibly used to easily break encryption algorithms and data security measures.
IBM’s bet is that it can combine its security and hybrid cloud knowhow with its quantum computing research.
The new tools under the quantum-safe effort from IBM include:
Quantum Safe Crypto Support, a service to secure data transmissions between hardware externally and internally via a quantum-safe algorithm.
Extended IBM Cloud Hyper Protect Crypto Service, a design to protect transactional data within applications. The protection covers encryption schemes in databases and digital signature validation.
These services will support the following:
IBM Key Protect and for Red Hat OpenShift on IBM Cloud;
IBM Cloud Kubernetes Service;
IBM Cloud Hyper Protect Crypto Services.
The quantum security efforts add to IBM’s existing portfolio including confidential computing, IBM Cloud Data Shield, research and IBM Cloud Security and Compliance Center.

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Remember when we all thought the internet would miraculously make the world better? That was then, and now we know the truth: bad people still do bad things. They just do it on the internet.
The ad-driven dynamic of commercial social media makes it profitable to drive outrage. Thoughtful and fact-based dialog is the first casualty.
Furthermore, automation has made it profitable to give each user a view of the world that maximizes involvement, without any sense of proportion or reality. The baseless Q fantasies are a case in point.

The Q delusions exploit defects in human information processing. At a more general level, our social media giants exploit the same defects to sell ads, without giving us the social contact we crave, especially in a pandemic.
Underneath the neighborly and family content are social network algorithms designed to drive users to more extreme content. Facebook in particular has repeatedly failed to control hateful, false, and dehumanizing content.
Why should they? It may be bad for civilization, but it’s great for the bottom line.
There is another way
There are alternatives, but we need more.

Decades ago advocates for non-commercial broadcasting prevailed upon the government to help fund a national, ad-free, network. Today, the Public Broadcasting Service, National Public Radio, C-SPAN, and a plethora of independent, non-profit, listener-supported radio and TV stations provide an alternative, for those who want one, to the 20 minutes of advertising every hour on commercial TV. Some 80 percent of US households tune in annually.
Why not a public, not-for-profit, social network? One whose algorithms would not push ever more extreme content. Where advertisers couldn’t micro-target you. That would refer users to multiple trustworthy sources and original documents on contentious issues.
In short, a social network where civility, facts, and reason would be valued and encouraged. And cat videos.
Yes, this wouldn’t be nearly as involving as the popular social networks are today. That’s the point.
Historical examples
Societies have faced highly addictive and damaging social trends before. It happens all the time.

When industrial scale distilleries made potent alcohol cheap in the 1730s, alcoholism and its evils soared, as memorably noted by William Hogarth. When TV was young, Fred Rogers, shocked by the low standard of children’s programs, began a program fondly remembered by millions of Americans.
Some problems can be solved. Others can only be managed. Social networks – and alcohol – are the latter, and must be managed, but not by only by government. Competition from a non-profit will give those who want to keep up with friends and family will have a safe space to do so.
Funding
Money is the easy part. Social media and tech firms would endow a foundation with $10 billion to create and manage the new social network. Why would they do that? Because it would relieve the pressure to regulate themselves, and the reduce the cry for censorship coming from politicians.
The network could generate income from individual donors, corporate sponsorships and the sale of subscriptions to private online sources. And coffee cups!
The take
Human beings are flawed, and always will be. And we will always be exploited by bad actors. That’s why we have regulations.
But regulations are just one tool, one that wealthy industries are adept at dodging. A non-profit social network is another way to – softly – rein in the excesses ad-driven social networks. Let’s not ask our government to regulate online speech.
Instead, let’s give people a non-commercial alternative to Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, just as we have for commercial broadcasting. And then let them choose the service they want.
Comments welcome. I was on Facebook briefly years ago. When I saw how they operated I left it and have never been tempted to return. More

Organisations in Singapore are facilitating remote work arrangements amidst the global pandemic, but being so has left more than half of them feeling anxious they are now more susceptible to cyber attacks. They believe companies should urge employees to be more mindful about cybersecurity and the resulting business consequences of an attack. 
Some 97% of businesses in Singapore currently had employees who worked from home and this figure was higher than their counterparts in Australia and Hong Kong, according to a study commissioned by AT&T, which polled 500 IT decision makers across the three Asia-Pacific markets.
Some 44% in Singapore had remote staff who were accessing corporate networks and data from personal devices, which was higher than the regional average of 35%. 

Global pandemic opening up can of security worms
Caught by the sudden onslaught of COVID-19, most businesses lacked or had inadequate security systems in place to support remote work and now have to deal with a new reality that includes a much wider attack surface and less secured user devices.
Read More

Their readiness to support a remote workplace, however, had left 58% of respondents in the city-state with concerns they were more vulnerable to cyber attacks. Some 12% of senior managers felt their organisations were not sufficiently prepared to manage a workforce that was shifting from the office to home. 
Across the region, 91% said they were prepared to support a remote workforce, but 39% pointed to Wi-Fi networks as the biggest security concern. Another 38% cited cloud storage as a worry, while 36% had security concerns about email and 34% were anxious about new technologies such as 5G and Internet of Things. Some 32% highlighted remote devices as a security risk and 31% pointed to video conferencing tools.
Bernard Yee, AT&T Business’ Asia-Pacific and Canada president, said: “The COVID-19 pandemic has created unprecedented opportunities for cybercriminals who are taking advantage of the fear and uncertainty surrounding the health crisis, along with the economic impact, which has caused massive shifts in IT environments exposing a wide range of vulnerabilities. 
“These are incredibly challenging times for IT specialists to keep businesses up and running remotely, while protecting their most valuable assets,” Yee noted, adding that employees remained a central part of the vulnerabilities in the security chain. “The need for businesses to support remote working is likely to be the new normal, so it is critical for companies to train and educate staff about the risks and the importance of following good cybersecurity practices.”

To mitigate security risks, 54% in Singapore believed organisations should share information about the nature and frequency of attacks to encourage their staff to be more mindful about cybersecurity. Employees also should be aware about the business consequences of cyber attacks. 
Another 52% in the country called for more training while 46% said employees should be made aware of news reports to highlight the impact on businesses. 
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A new form of cyberattack has been developed which highlights the potential future ramifications of digital assaults against the biological research sector.

On Monday, academics from the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev described how “unwitting” biologists and scientists could become victims of cyberattacks designed to take biological warfare to another level. 
At a time where scientists worldwide are pushing ahead with the development of potential vaccines to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, Ben-Gurion’s team says that it is no longer the case that a threat actor needs physical access to a “dangerous” substance to produce or deliver it — instead, scientists could be duped into producing toxins or synthetic viruses on their behalf through targeted cyberattacks. 
See also: Human biohacking: an exciting prospect, but only for the rich?
The research, “Cyberbiosecurity: Remote DNA Injection Threat in Synthetic Biology,” has been recently published in the academic journal Nature Biotechnology.
The attack documents how malware, used to infiltrate a biologist’s computer, could replace sub-strings in DNA sequencing. Specifically, weaknesses in the Screening Framework Guidance for Providers of Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA and Harmonized Screening Protocol v2.0 systems “enable protocols to be circumvented using a generic obfuscation procedure.”
When DNA orders are made to synthetic gene providers, US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) guidance requires screening protocols to be in place to scan for potentially harmful DNA. 

However, it was possible for the team to circumvent these protocols through obfuscation, in which 16 out of 50 obfuscated DNA samples were not detected against ‘best match’ DNA screening. 
Software used to design and manage synthetic DNA projects may also be susceptible to man in-the-browser attacks that can be used to inject arbitrary DNA strings into genetic orders, facilitating what the team calls an “end-to-end cyberbiological attack.”
CNET: Tesla Model X vulnerable to Bluetooth hack that makes theft a breeze, report says
The synthetic gene engineering pipeline offered by these systems can be tampered with in browser-based attacks. Remote hackers could use malicious browser plugins, for example, to “inject obfuscated pathogenic DNA into an online order of synthetic genes.”
In a case demonstrating the possibilities of this attack, the team cited residue Cas9 protein, using malware to transform this sequence into active pathogens. Cas9 protein, when using CRISPR protocols, can be exploited to “deobfuscate malicious DNA within the host cells,” according to the team.
For an unwitting scientist processing the sequence, this could mean the accidental creation of dangerous substances, including synthetic viruses or toxic material. 
TechRepublic: Top 5 business sectors targeted by ransomware
“To regulate both intentional and unintentional generation of dangerous substances, most synthetic gene providers screen DNA orders which is currently the most effective line of defense against such attacks,” commented Rami Puzis, head of the BGU Complex Networks Analysis Lab. “Unfortunately, the screening guidelines have not been adapted to reflect recent developments in synthetic biology and cyberwarfare.”
A potential attack chain is outlined below:

“This attack scenario underscores the need to harden the synthetic DNA supply chain with protections against cyber-biological threats,” Puzis added. “To address these threats, we propose an improved screening algorithm that takes into account in vivo gene editing.”

Previous and related coverage
Have a tip? Get in touch securely via WhatsApp | Signal at +447713 025 499, or over at Keybase: charlie0 More

Eligible non-bank financial institutions in Singapore soon will have direct access to the country’s retail payment platforms, PayNow and FAST, which will enable e-wallet users to make funds transfers between bank accounts and across different e-wallets. Most e-wallets currently can be topped up only via credit or debit cards and funds cannot be transferred between e-wallets. 
To plug this gap, a new API (application programming interface) payment gateway has been developed under guidelines from the Singapore Clearing House Association (SCHA) and Association of Banks in Singapore (ABS), both of which govern FAST and PayNow, respectively. The API is designed to better fit the technology architecture of banks and non-bank financial institutions, according to industry regulator Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS). 

FAST, or Fast and Secure Transfers, is an electronic funds transfer service that allows real-time funds transfers, in Singapore dollars, between entities, while PayNow — running on top the FAST system — enables instant digital payments between accounts using a proxy, such as mobile numbers, national identification numbers, or Unique Entity Number. 
According to MAS, more than 12.5 million FAST transactions were processed each month in the latest quarter ended September, with PayNow accounting for almost half of the monthly volume. 
The move to provide direct access to non-bank institutions came more than a year after the regulator first announced plans to do so in September 2018. These institutions will need to be licensed under the Payment Services Act. 
The new API was developed by a group of industry players including banks and non-bank financial institutions, including Citi Singapore, Deutsche Bank AG Singapore, Standard Chartered Singapore, Grab Financial Group, Liquid Group, Razer Fintech, and Singtel Dash. Grab and Razer are amongst several non-banks vying for a digital bank licence in Singapore, which is expected to unveil the winning bidders by year-end.
With the API, organisations that collaborate with any of the 23 FAST or nine PayNow banks, including e-wallets that previously operated in closed-loop platforms, would be able to receive real-time payments from mobile banking apps or other e-wallets that planned to tap the two payment platforms.

Effective from February 2021, the expansion of direct access to the payment platforms would enable businesses to access a wider consumer segment to receive real-time e-payments.
MAS’ managing director Ravi Menon said: “Direct access by non-bank financial institutions to FAST and PayNow closes the last-mile gap in Singapore’s e-payments journey. Consumers who may not have ready access to debit or credit cards to fund their e-wallets will now have the option to do so directly through their bank accounts.
“Our vision to enable complete real-time payments interoperability will now become a reality. Adoption of e-payments will become even more simple for individuals and businesses,” Menon added.
ABS’ director Ong Ai-Boon noted that this marked the first time access to the two e-payment platforms had been opened to non-banks, with the aim to provide consumers greater convenience and options. “FAST and PayNow adoption rates have exceeded expectations and we are confident the addition of new players will help accelerate the national path towards a less-cash economy,” Ong said.
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Under Australia’s Telecommunications Sector Security Reforms (TSSR), all carriers and nominated carriage service providers (C/NCSPs) are required to notify the Communications Access Coordinator (CAC) of proposed changes to their telecommunications systems or services if they become aware of any proposed changes that are likely to have a “material adverse effect” on their capacity to comply with security obligations.
As of 30 June 2020, the Department of Home Affairs has received a total of 66 notifications. It told the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) the notifications received from carriers to date represented the vast majority of the fixed-line and mobile telecommunications market in Australia.
In its submission [PDF] to the PJCIS, Home Affairs suggested additional types of notices “with more nuanced language” to reflect various levels and types of risk and the urgency of adopting further mitigations.
See also: The disappointment of Australia’s new cybersecurity strategy
“Home Affairs notes that there has been some variation among C/NCSPs in their approach to the TSSR notification obligation. The obligation relies on self-determination by C/NCSPs of whether a proposed change warrants a notification, regardless of the guidance provided by Home Affairs,” it wrote.
“There have been instances where Home Affairs has engaged with a carrier about a proposed change to their networks and subsequently recommended that the carrier submit a notification as it was Home Affairs’ view that the features and characteristics of the proposed change introduced significant risk.”
Despite Home Affairs’ recommendations to these carriers, the department said they did not proceed to submit a formal notification, as in the carrier’s view, the proposed changes to their networks or facilities did not meet the carrier’s internal risk assessment thresholds for formal notification.

“In the absence of a notification, government has no visibility of changes to networks or steps taken to mitigate risks and cannot provide advice,” Home Affairs said.
The PJCIS is currently conducting a statutory review of the operation of Part 14 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 to the extent that it was amended by the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2017 TSSR.
The reforms passed in September 2017 and commenced exactly one year later, which established a regulatory framework for managing the national security risks of Australia’s telecommunications networks and facilities.
Home Affairs said telecommunications networks and facilities, and the carriers and CSPs that own or operate them, are attractive targets for espionage, sabotage, and foreign interference activity by state and non-state actors.
“TSSR is a principles-based framework that formalises the good faith engagement between Home Affairs and Australia’s telecommunications sector to better manage national security risks to telecommunications networks,” the department says.
The TSSR introduced four key elements: Security obligation, notification obligation, information gathering power, and a directions power.
Home Affairs said amending the Act to allow it to request notification about a proposed change, including in circumstances where a C/NCSP has internally determined that it need not notify, would ensure that any changes to telecommunications networks and systems do not introduce national security risks.
Amending the Act to give Home Affairs the ability to impose conditions, including conditions relating to the use of entities in the supply chain, or require a C/NCSP to take specific action would help to mitigate identified risks with a proposed change, the department said. It explained this would ensure the conditions or mitigations are implemented and appropriate for the lifecycle of the change. 
In making this statement, the department noted amendments to include a formal mechanism that requires the C/NCSP to continue to engage with Home Affairs after conditions or mitigations have been imposed.
The department also flagged the requirement for C/NCSPs to have in place a security capability plan that can demonstrate they are meeting their baseline security requirements as another potential TSSR enhancement.
This is tackled in the Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure) Bill 2020, which seeks to amend the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 to implement “an enhanced framework to uplift the security and resilience of Australia’s critical infrastructure”.
Read more: Tech giants not convinced Australia’s critical infrastructure Bill is currently fit for purpose
“Noting that telecommunications remains a key sector of critical infrastructure, the [positive security obligation (PSO)], if applied to the telecommunications sector  … could replace the current security capability plan provision,” Home Affairs said.
Further enhancements were listed under the directions powers, which grants the Minister for Home Affairs the power to issue a written direction to a C/CSP not to use or supply, or to cease using or supplying, a carriage service if, after consulting the Prime Minister and the Minister for Communications, Cyber Safety and the Arts, the minister considers the proposed use or supply of the carriage service is or would be prejudicial to security.
“The directions powers are considered to be appropriate last resort mechanisms. However, the graduated powers that will be available under the [Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Systems of National Significance] reforms, should they be passed by Parliament, would assist to provide options for government to address risks that are of a lower order,” it said.
“Graduated powers being designed under the … reforms could extend the positive security obligation that includes risk management planning obligations which would allow government to indicate where telecommunications entities may need to take steps to address risks in their supply chains without resorting to the directions power.”
Telstra used its submission [PDF] to the PJCIS to highlight its support of the use of the existing TSSR framework and that it believes there will be significant benefits in using it to meet the government’s objectives of strengthening the existing security of critical infrastructure framework.
It asked for the informal engagement model to be legislated into the TSSR and that formal notifications be used as a last resort mechanism where entities fail to engage with government.
Telstra also recommended that the information gathering and direction powers under the TSSR remain in place and be carried into the sector-specific rules under the proposed Critical Infrastructure and Systems of National Significance reforms.
“Whilst this regime has not been tested, the safeguards and guardrails were heavily negotiated during the TSSR implementation and should remain,” the telco said.
Global cybersecurity firm Palo Alto Networks also submitted [PDF] its opinion to the committee, asking the PJCIS look at ways to “encourage and incentify ISPs and telcos to maintain constant real-time visibility across traffic passing through their networks and be able to detect and stop cybersecurity threats in real time within that traffic for all customers”.
It also noted the merits of adopting a clean pipes solution to protect the nation from cyber threats and make it a less attractive target to adversaries.
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