Eliana Willis

Organizations are losing millions of dollars in revenue each year due to leaked infrastructure code, credentials and keys, according to a new report from 1Password. 1Password’s report “Hiding in Plain Sight” said that on average, enterprises lose an average of $1.2 million each year due to leaked details, which researchers at the company called “secrets.” Researchers found that IT and DevOps workers leave infrastructure secrets like API tokens, SSH keys, and private certificates in config files or next to source code for easy access and to make things move faster.The report features analysis from 1Password researchers as well as an April 2021 survey of 500 IT and DevOps workers in the US. For 10% of respondents who experienced secret leakage, their company lost more than $5 million. More than 60% of respondents said their organizations have dealt with secrets leakage. In addition to the money lost, 40% said their organizations suffered from brand reputation damage and 29% said clients were lost due to the consequences of secrets that had been leaked. According to the report and accompanying survey, 65% of IT and DevOps employees say their company has more than 500 secrets, with almost 20% saying they have more than they can count. Employees have to spend about 25 minutes every day managing these secrets and more than half say that number has increased significantly over the last year. More than 61% said multiple projects had to be delayed because their organization could not effectively manage its secrets. 

Alarmingly, 77% of respondents said they still have access to a former employer’s systems and 37% said they had full access, highlighting one of the main reasons why secrets continue to be leaked. Another factor contributing to the problem is the growing use of cloud applications, which 52% of IT and DevOps workers said made it harder to manage secrets. But IT and DevOps workers acknowledged some of the blame, with 80% saying they did not do a good job of managing secrets. About 25% said their organization’s secrets are in 10 of more locations. IT and DevOps workers also admitted to sharing information about company secrets over less-than-secure channels including email (59%), Slack (40%), spreadsheets/shared documents (36%) and text (26%). Almost all respondents said their organization has a secrets policy but less than 40% said it is enforced. The problem is particularly acute among organizations leaders. More than 62% of respondents said team leads, managers, VPs and others have ignored security rules due to COVID-19 demands on work.  “Secrets are now the lifeblood for IT and DevOps as they seek to support the explosion of apps and services now required in the modern enterprise” 1Password CEO Jeff Shiner said.”Our research reveals that secrets are booming, but IT and DevOps teams are not meeting rigorous standards to protect them — and in the process are putting organizations at risk of incurring tremendous cost. It’s time for companies to take a hard look at how they manage secrets, and adopt practices and solutions to  ‘put the secret back into secrets’ to support a culture of security.” More

On Wednesday, Senator Rick Scott ended his objection to the unanimous consent needed for the Senate to vote on the nomination of Jen Easterly to be Director of CISA.Scott had been holding up the vote as a way to force Vice President Kamala Harris to visit the US-Mexico border. He said he would refuse to confirm any Department of Homeland Security nominees until Harris went to the border, which she did last Friday. “This isn’t about Ms. Easterly. This isn’t about cybersecurity,” Scott said last week. Despite lifting his hold on her nomination, all of Congress is away for the July 4 holiday and Easterly will not be confirmed until after Congress returns on July 9. CISA has not had an official director since former President Donald Trump fired Chris Krebs in November. His deputy, Brandon Wales, has been holding the position on an interim basis ever since, even as the country continues to deal with the fallout from the SolarWinds hacks and a number of other state-sponsored attacks on government organizations. A number of lawmakers and experts, like Krebs, took to Twitter to criticize the decision to hold up Easterly’s confirmation. Krebs even joked that Easterly’s confirmation was being “ransomed” by politicians and said the situation was “one more reason it’s time for a conversation about splitting up DHS.”Rep. Jim Langevin, one of the most vocal members of Congress on cyber issues, told ZDNet that the Cyberspace Solarium Commission looked at several different models for civilian and critical infrastructure cybersecurity, including spinning off a separate agency.  

“However, our ultimate conclusion was to double down on CISA in its current form. We passed a number of new provisions intended to do just that last year, and the House just released draft legislation increasing CISA’s budget by nearly 20 percent,” Langevin said.  “I believe CISA can be perfectly effective within DHS if properly resourced and given the right authorities.”Among former government officials, opinions were more mixed on the topic. Drew Jaehnig spent more than 20 years managing networks and IT services and other technology at the Department of Defense. Jaehnig, who is now a director of Bizagi Government Services, said that before CISA’s creation in 2018, DHS already had the task of securing US critical physical and cyber infrastructure with the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD). The NPPD was created in 2007 and was charged with tracking all visitors to the country, providing federal protective services for federal owned and leased assets, assuring the reliability of the nation’s cyber and communications infrastructure, and reducing risks to the nation’s critical infrastructure, according to Jaehnig, who added that the cyber component was originally organized under the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C). “It is important to understand that the Department of Defense was working to protect the DoD cyberinfrastructure initially with the JTF-GNO (Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations) that was later to be part of the Cyber Command,” Jaehnig said.  “The civil agencies and national infrastructure needed something similar and as such, the CS&C was created. The CS&C’s resources and standing were not sufficient to accomplish the given task, and in 2018 the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act elevated the agency to a higher standing in DHS. Subsequent actions have substantially increased the resources available to CISA. Indeed, in the upcoming year, Congress is seeking $2.42 billion for CISA, $300M above what the President’s budget requested.” Jaehnig said there is a lot of overlap between the jobs of CISA and DHS, and the idea of spinning CISA into its own agency “would probably only complicate the nation’s response to any major cyber or infrastructure incident.” “The mission to secure borders, uphold economic prosperity, and increase our preparedness and resilience are all tied to the cyber and physical infrastructure,” he said.  Despite advocating that the organizations stay connected, Jaehnig acknowledged that the arguments for splitting CISA from DHS are centered around it not getting enough attention and voice within DHS.  He also noted that the situation with Easterly was part of a larger problem of CISA-related issues being lumped into the controversies that typically swirl around DHS in relation to border policies. He added that others have argued that any coordination issues created by separating CISA from the DHS can be overcome, as they have with DHS and the FBI on cybercrimes. Some private industry cybersecurity groups have also expressed hesitancy about working with DHS due to the public debates over border policies, according to Jaehnig.  But in the end, Jaehnig agreed with Langevin that CISA simply needed more resources and increased focus by the private and public sectors on infrastructure protection and resiliency.  “With the continued blurring of the line between the cyber and the physical, this is more apparent than ever. These would be steps in the right direction and would address many of the concerns of those wishing a split and avoid a messy reorganization that would interrupt operational responses at a critical juncture,” Jaehnig said. “In the current environment, this is an issue that is likely to be more troublesome to the hill than keeping the status quo and adopting the Solarium recommendations. The Solarium recommendations are more practical to pass in legislation, as already accomplished with the appointment of a National Cyber Director, also in the CSC’s 2020 recommendations. Indeed, Congress adopted 27 of the 80 recommendations last year, and this year the CSC is working on getting 30 more of its recommendations codified into law. Politically, this approach is working even in today’s polarized political landscape.” Other former government officials took a different stance, arguing that CISA’s ties to DHS complicated the organization’s mission and added additional red tape that made it harder for the agency to respond quickly to cyber incidents. Jake Williams, who spent years in the US Army and now serves as CTO at BreachQuest, told ZDNet he was working in the intelligence field when DHS was created and said, “even then it wasn’t clear it could perform its mission without adding more bureaucracy.” Williams said it is time to have discussions about a cabinet-level position for cybersecurity. “Politics aside, what we’re seeing now is budget and focus being split within DHS between immediate cybersecurity and physical security needs. In these types of ‘immediate need’ dilemmas, cybersecurity almost always loses,” Williams explained. “I would fully support a cabinet-level directorate focused on cybersecurity. It’s sorely needed today and not something we can kick down the road.”Others who have worked alongside the US government on cybersecurity issues also said CISA may be better served by operating within another agency. Bill O’Neill, a vice president at ThycoticCentrify, has spent years at companies that worked with the Defense Department and other agencies on cybersecurity.He noted that the previous presidential administration succeeded in ensuring CISA became a more fully realized government agency and added that Krebs’ leadership — coupled with its role in protecting the integrity of the 2020 election — resulted in a new level of credibility, visibility, and autonomy for CISA.O’Neill said DHS’s agenda, regulatory focus, and priority to work with sector-specific agencies “undermines and supersedes CISA’s mandate to handle civilian cybersecurity issues, diminishing the country’s ability to fight cybercrime on a united front.” “If CISA were decoupled from DHS and integrated instead into the ranks of US Cyber Command, the agency would have much greater efficiency and independence to implement policies for civilian incident response unencumbered,” he said. “You can correlate a sharp rise in cyberattacks across the country with the lack of defined oversight of US cyber defense strategy. And although Jen Easterly was nominated for the role of CISA Director three months ago, the Senate failed to confirm her. At a time when cyberattacks are at an all-time high, a vacuum in cybersecurity leadership only emboldens cyber criminals.” More

Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs will be collaborating with SAP to help identify and develop more diverse talent in the cybersecurity sector in the coming years. The software giant is hoping to help promote diversity in cybersecurity through increased funding and a variety of internships, job opportunities, curriculum assistance and events at Columbia University. Jason Healey, cyberthreat intelligence expert and senior research scholar at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, said the funding provided by SAP would help the school attract a wider pool of candidates interested in cybersecurity. “Due to SAP’s funding, we’re already finding new opportunities to reach out to our diverse student body to let them know about the amazing job prospects in cybersecurity, even for those outside of STEM,” Healey said. “The events, projects, information and first-hand experience our students will have access to will be extremely valuable for their career development.”Tim McKnight, the chief security officer at SAP, explained that it was the software industry’s responsibility to devise new ways to protect valuable data and support business operations and secure enterprises of all sizes. SAP’s relationship with Columbia University will allow the company “to identify diverse talent to keep SAP’s customers and products safe while providing students and recent graduates an opportunity to launch a new and exciting career,” McKnight added. 

In addition to funding and campus events, SAP will also sponsor “Capstone workshops” that allow students to “work with and advise external clients.”There is an outsized need for cybersecurity talent across the country as organizations struggle to protect themselves from an evolving cyberthreat landscape. Elena Kvochko, the chief trust officer at SAP, noted that there was still a significant gender disparity in the cybersecurity workforce despite the increased demand. She said she was hopeful that the program would help diversify the industry and “bring new ideas, skills and creativity when solving security challenges.”Kvochko told ZDNet that much of the collaboration would consist of SAP’s support for campus hiring and recruiting to provide a greater opportunity for graduates to start their careers in the cybersecurity and technology sectors. “The goal is to immerse students in the cybersecurity world and give them the opportunity to explore this fast-growing field. The capstone projects will be designed and developed around the most pressing needs of the cybersecurity sector, so that students, graduates and SAP employees have exposure to diverse perspectives from around the world,” Kvochko said. “SAP is excited to have the first group of recent graduates joining us this summer. We are prepared to lead groups of students of different sizes in their cybersecurity journey while helping to close the diversity gaps in our field and ensure diversity of perspectives.” More

Organisations can test their network defences and evaluate if their cybersecurity procedures can protect them from a ransomware attack using a new self-assessment tool from the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). The Ransomware Readiness Assessment (RRA) is a new module in CISA’s Cyber Security Evaluation Tool (CSET) that allows organisations to assess how well equipped they are to defend and recover from a ransomware attack. 

Accessible by desktop software, the self-assessment tool can be applied to both information technology (IT) and industrial control system (ICS) networks, and enables users to evaluate their cybersecurity strategy based on government and industry recommendations and standards.SEE: Cybersecurity: Let’s get tactical (ZDNet/TechRepublic special feature) | Download the free PDF version (TechRepublic)”The Ransomware Readiness Assessment (RRA) will help you understand your cybersecurity posture with respect to the ever-evolving threat of ransomware,” says the tool’s release notes.  The CISA tool asks users to answer a series of questions about their cybersecurity policies with the aim helping organisations improve their defences against ransomware. It focuses on the basics first, before moving onto intermediate and advanced questions and tutorials.The aim is to make it useful for organisations whatever the state of their cybersecurity strategy, so CISA is strongly encouraging all organisations to take the Ransomware Readiness Assessment. 

“CISA has tailored the RRA to varying levels of ransomware threat readiness to make it useful to all organizations regardless of their current cybersecurity maturity,” said CISA.  Following the high-profile ransomware attack against Colonial Pipeline, the United States has taken a firmer stance against ransomware and is encouraging organisations to do more to shore up their networks’ defences.SEE: Ransomware: Paying up won’t stop you from getting hit again, says cybersecurity chiefPresident Joe Biden signed an executive order to boost cybersecurity across the US federal government. The US President has also discussed ransomware with Russian President Vladimir Putin.While the exact subjects discussed during the meeting in Geneva, Switzerland aren’t known, it’s believed that Biden tried to press Putin on the issue of ransomware gangs working out of Russia.MORE ON CYBERSECURITY More

Ransomware attacks are targeting legacy industrial control systems (ICS) and more needs to be done to secure networks at industrial facilities against the threat of being disrupted by cyber criminals attempting to make money from extortion. A report by cybersecurity researchers at Trend Micro warns that ransomware is “a concerning and rapidly evolving threat to ICS endpoints globally” with a significant rise in activity during the past year. 

The motive behind ransomware attacks is simple – making money. Cyber criminals know that by hitting the industrial control systems used to operate factories and manufacturing environments, which rely on constant uptime, they have a good chance of getting paid.SEE: Cybersecurity: Let’s get tactical (ZDNet/TechRepublic special feature) | Download the free PDF version (TechRepublic)These networks, and the ones that support utilities like water and power, need to be fully operational in order to provide services and the longer the network is down, the more disruption there will be, so the victim might make the decision to give in and meet the ransom demand of the cyber criminals. “The underground cybercrime economy is big business for ransomware operators and affiliates alike. Industrial Control Systems found in critical national infrastructure, manufacturing and other facilities are seen as soft targets, with many systems still running legacy operating systems and unpatched applications. Any infection on these systems will most likely cause days if not weeks of outage,” said Bharat Mistry, technical director at Trend Micro. Recent examples of successful ransomware campaigns like the attack against meat processor JBS demonstrate just how lucrative ransomware can be, as cyber criminals using REvil ransomware were able to make off with $11 million in bitcoin. 

Meanwhile, the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack showed how a ransomware attack against an industrial target can have very real consequences for people, as gasoline supplies to much of the north-eastern United States were limited because of the attack. Cyber criminals using many different forms of ransomware are targeting industrial control systems but four families of ransomware account for over half of these attacks. They are Ryuk – which accounts for one in five ransomware attacks affecting ICS by itself – Nefilm, REvil (also known as Sodinokibi) and LockBit.  

ZDNet Recommends

The best cyber insurance

The cyber insurance industry is likely to go mainstream and is a simple cost of doing business. Here are a few options to consider.

Read More

According to the report, the US is the country with the most instances of ransomware affecting ICSs, followed by India, Taiwan and Spain. SEE: Ransomware: Paying up won’t stop you from getting hit again, says cybersecurity chiefTo help secure ICS endpoints against ransomware and other cyberattacks, the Trend Micro report offers several recommendations. They include patching systems with security updates, something the paper acknowledges as a “tedious” but necessary process. By ensuring networks are patched with the latest security updates, it means cyber criminals can’t exploit known vulnerabilities that can be protected against. If patching isn’t an option, then the network should be segmented in order to restrict vulnerable industrial control systems from internet-connected systems.  It’s also recommended that ICS networks are secured with strong username and passwords combinations that are difficult to crack with brute force attacks. Applying multi-factor authentication across the network can also help secure it against unauthorized intrusions. MORE ON CYBERSECURITY  More

What you think you know as PrintNightmare, might not be what Microsoft refers to, or then again it might. During the week, PrintNightware, a critical Windows print spooler vulnerability that allowed for remote code execution was known as CVE-2021-1675. Exploits were publicly available after Microsoft’s patches failed to fix the issue completely and the security researchers had already published their code, said they deleted it, but it was already branched on GitHub. In short, if it was a supported version of Windows, it had a hole in it. “Microsoft has partially addressed this issue in their update for CVE-2021-1675. Microsoft Windows systems that are configured to be domain controllers and those that have Point and Print configured with the NoWarningNoElevationOnInstall option configured are still vulnerable,” the CERT Coordination Center said. The workaround suggestion was to disable the Print Spooler service. A potentially bad situation got further muddied when Microsoft dropped its CVE-2021-34527 notice on Thursday.

“A remote code execution vulnerability exists when the Windows Print Spooler service improperly performs privileged file operations. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights,” the notice said. “An attack must involve an authenticated user calling RpcAddPrinterDriverEx().” So this seems like PrintNightmare, it’s going after the same function, and Microsoft says it is the same, but then it isn’t. Here’s the FAQ in full that Microsoft has published. Is this the vulnerability that has been referred to publicly as PrintNightmare? Yes, Microsoft has assigned CVE-2021-34527 to this vulnerability. Is this vulnerability related to CVE-2021-1675? This vulnerability is similar but distinct from the vulnerability that is assigned CVE-2021-1675, which addresses a different vulnerability in RpcAddPrinterDriverEx(). The attack vector is different as well. CVE-2021-1675 was addressed by the June 2021 security update. Did the June 2021 update introduce this vulnerability? No, the vulnerability existed before the June 2021 security update. Microsoft strongly recommends installing the June 2021 updates. What specific roles are known to be affected by the vulnerability? Domain controllers are affected. We are still investigating if other types of roles are also affected. All versions of Windows are listed in the Security Updates table. Are all versions exploitable? The code that contains the vulnerability is in all versions of Windows. We are still investigating whether all versions are exploitable. We will update this CVE when that information is evident. Why did Microsoft not assign a CVSS score to this vulnerability? We are still investigating the issue so we cannot assign a score at this time. Why is the severity of this vulnerability not defined? We are still investigating. We will make this information available soon. So due to a different attack vector, Microsoft has broken out a second CVE. The suggested workaround is to disable the print spooler service or disable inbound remote printing through group policy. “This policy will block the remote attack vector by preventing inbound remote printing operations. The system will no longer function as a print server, but local printing to a directly attached device will still be possible,” the warning attached to the workarounds state. For CVE-2021-1675, it earned a CVSS 3 base score of 7.8 and is clearly considered by Microsoft since there is no workaround section. “This is an evolving situation and we will update the CVE as more information is available,” Microsoft said. No doubt they will. Related Coverage More